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The International Monetary Fund is facing an uncertain future.  Notwithstanding 
the important contributions it has made in helping the global economy deal with 
major economic and financial changes and crises over the past 25 years, its role is 
now questioned.  New lending by the Fund is negligible; its role as policy advisor 
to member countries seems diminished; and its oversight role in fostering stability 
in the international monetary system is uncertain.  Efforts to reform the Fund and 
to better define its place in the global economic and financial system have been 
underway for some time.  The most recent attempt at reform began in the context of 
the Medium Term Strategy (MTS) announced by Rodrigo de Rato, the then managing 
director,  and  endorsed  by  the  International  Monetary  and  Financial  Committee 
(IMFC) in April 2006.  Some successes have come from those efforts.  However, a 
great deal remains to be done, both on issues elaborated in the MTS and on matters 
well beyond the scope of that strategy.  Progress will require the full commitment 
on the new managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. This paper will review the 
major items that are, or that should be, on the agenda for reforming the IMF. In 
certain areas, specific reform proposals will be suggested; in other areas, formulating 
concrete proposals and securing the necessary political support will require much 
more debate and discussion than has taken place to date. On these latter issues, the 
paper will present background and diagnostics rather than specific proposals as a 
way of advancing those discussions. 
The major elements of reform must include the following:
I. More clearly defining the role of the IMF in the emerging global economic and 
financial system.
This will need to be done with agreement among the broadest possible segments of 
the membership and will require, in particular:
a.  Clarifying  the  monitoring  and  surveillance  role  of  the  Fund  –  both 
surveillance over the global system, including financial markets, as well as 
over the economies of individual member countries;
 
b.  Forging broad agreement on the Fund’s financing role, and the facilities and 
the resources needed to fulfill that role; and
c.  Seeking broader consensus on the overall role to be played by the Fund in 
the low income countries.
1 Former Counselor and Special Advisor to the Managing Director, and Former Director of the Policy Development 
and Review Department, International Monetary Fund.3
II.  Modifying  and  improving  critical  aspects  of  the  governance  of  the  Fund, 
including:
a.  Pressing forward with a new energy, and a far more ambitious agenda, the 
alignment of member country quotas and voting power with the realities 
of the emerging global economy and the place of each member in that 
economy; going beyond quotas and voting power, but within the context 
of that discussion, to some of the other factors that determine the voice of 
members in the Fund. This will involve, inter alia, the size and composition 
of the executive board and the quality of representation of member countries 
on that board.
b.  Reexamining the responsibilities and accountabilities of those charged with 
over-seeing and running the operations of the Fund.  This will require, in 
particular, more active application of the principles of good governance in 
the Fund; and
c.  Finding a better alignment between the structure of and representation in the 
various agenda-setting bodies – the G7/8, G20, et al, and the configuration 
of the governing boards of the international financial institutions, including 
the  IMF.  (This  is  obviously  a  longer  term  issue  and  is  well  beyond  the 
influence of IMF management alone.) 
III. Reviewing the management structure of the Fund, as well as the mechanisms 
to assess the responsibilities and accountability of management.  And,
IV. Radically altering the Fund’s income model to assure sustainable funding 
regardless of the level of the Fund’s lending operations.
This is a massive agenda comprising a large number of issues, many of which are 
deeply  intertwined.  For  example,  better  definition  of  the  role  of  the  Fund  will 
influence the appropriate size and skill mix of the staff and, thereby, the cost of 
running the institution and the feasibility of certain income models to cover the 
associated costs. Agreement on the potential financing role of the Fund is necessary 
to determine the appropriate size of the financial resources of the Fund and global 
quotas. Thus, there needs to be a better sequencing of debate on these issues than 
has been the case in recent discussions. At the same time, some of the needed 
reforms are generally independent of the resolution of these other issues, and some 
are urgent. On the top of that list is reform of management, which should be the 
highest priority of the new managing director and of the executive board.
This paper will take up, in turn, each of the issues listed above.4
I. The Role of the Fund
The Fund has made major contributions to the resolution of problems that have 
confronted the global economic and financial system over the past several decades.   
These have included the oil crises of the 1970’s; the emerging market debt crises of 
the 1980’s; the integration of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union into the global system in the 1990’s; the long-smoldering debt 
crises of the low income countries, culminating in the HIPC Initiative in the 1990’s; 
the Mexican, Asian, Russian, Turkish and Latin American crises of the mid and later 
1990’s and early years of this decade; and, the establishment, implementation and 
assessment of standards and codes over the past decade. The Fund’s role was central 
in each of these events.  
At the same time, however, the way in which the Fund has gone about some of 
its activities has been questioned. Critics, as well as some supporters of the Fund, 
have offered a laundry list of ways in which the institution is said to have expanded 
its activities well beyond its original mandate while, at the same time, coming up 
short on the job it is supposed to perform under the original Articles of Agreement 
and the Second Amendment.  The list includes a widening, and alleged weakening, 
of the focus of its surveillance activities; straying into areas in which it had little 
expertise or an uncertain mandate;2 the broadening of the focus of its work in the 
low  income  countries;  the  breadth  of  the  structural  conditionality  included  in 
financial arrangements with member countries; and an unnecessary proliferation 
of the facilities for providing financing to countries seeking its assistance. There has 
also been criticism that the institution has not been doing, or not doing sufficiently 
well, some of the things that it should be doing – perhaps distracted by its activities 
in the areas peripheral to its core mandate.  The responsibilities on which it is said 
to fall short  include the monitoring of or, more importantly, the force of its policy 
advice regarding global imbalances, a key threat that has confronted, and continues 
to confront, the global economy;3  its lack of influence over the policies of the larger 
industrial countries; an insufficient involvement in global financial sector issues; 
and the lack of engagement with emerging market economies on some of the policy 
issues of greatest concern to them, including on the practical aspects of managing 
their exchange rate regimes and the opening of their capital accounts.4 These issues 
go to the heart of the Fund’s surveillance responsibilities.
a. Fund Surveillance
Notwithstanding  the  identification  of  some  of  these  issues  in  the  Medium  Term 
Strategy, better direction is needed to improve the Fund’s contribution to member 
countries in their policy choices, including those made to confront the challenges of 
2 These include activities such as the work related to money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
and the coverage of certain social issues in the context of Article IV consultations. The Fund’s Legal department alone 
reportedly devotes 25 staff and contractuals to the former activity.
3 While the imbalances may be declining, the residue of those imbalances in the excessive reserves held by some 
countries, the explosion of sovereign wealth funds, etc. pose new challenges to the global financial system.
4 This is not the oft-heard critique that the Fund forced countries into premature liberalization of their capital accounts. 
That fiction was put to rest by the study done by the Fund’s Independent Evaluation Office. Rather, the more recent 
critique is aimed at the lack of capacity among staff to give practical advice to member countries on their exchange 
rate regimes and on the best policy path for integrating banking and financial systems into the global economy. See: 
IEO Evaluation of Exchange Rate Policy Advice – 1999-2005, May 17, 2007 and the IEO Report on the Evaluation of the IMF’s 
Approach to Capital Account Liberalization, April 20, 2005.5
globalization, as well as to the stability of the global economic and financial system 
and  the  responses  of  member  countries  to  the  major  changes  underway  in  that 
system. For example, some question the Fund’s effectiveness – both before and since 
the launching of the multilateral surveillance initiative – in containing the potential 
threat to the global system from the persistent imbalances of the past decade.5  In 
this context, critics have asked where the Fund stands in viewing the enormous build 
up in reserves that has taken place in recent years in reflection of these imbalances 
and  what  it  has  done  to  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the  implication  of 
those reserve levels, and their investment, both for individual countries and for the 
system. Similarly, the Fund has been faulted for the lack of precision in its advice to 
countries regarding exchange rate and other policies, including those of the countries 
contributing most to the global imbalances. Perhaps most importantly, it has also 
been criticized for its slow adjustment from a mostly macroeconomic focus in its 
work to a broader view encompassing the dynamics of financial markets.  Despite 
the creation of new departments and the reorganization of others, there continues 
to be a ‘silo’ mentality within the institution. This results in an undue focus of the 
staff on the problems and issues of their own department and an insufficient synergy 
of work across departments. This has, at times, prevented the best mobilization and 
integration of staff in dealing with critical issues.  The Fund has an extraordinary base 
of experience in helping countries confront economic and financial policy challenges. 
But that experience has not always been brought to bear as well as it might have been 
in providing advice to member countries or in assessing the implications of emerging 
tensions for the global system.  In particular, and despite recent efforts, there remains 
a need for a genuine integration of financial sector issues with the world class macro 
economic analysis that has been the hallmark of the Fund over its entire history. 
To be fair, the Fund has been a player in all these debates, and has taken a number of 
important steps to better align the organization and the skills of its staff to the realities 
of globalized financial markets. Most observers continue to give the Fund and its staff 
high marks for its analytic capacity and its increasing familiarity with institutional 
issues in the financial sector to address such problems. The issue turns, rather, on 
the timeliness, force and effectiveness of its advice, the positions it has taken as the 
pre-eminent arbiter of macroeconomic policy issues in the international system, its 
pace of change in the face of major developments in global financial markets, and 
its capacity to provide practical policy guidance to its members. Changes in some of 
these areas could come more quickly, but require a willingness – and support from 
the membership at large – to be more candid, more specific, and more forceful in 
its recommendations to all member countries, including the largest.6 In other areas, 
change will be evolutionary, but should occur in the context of a vision of the role of 
the Fund more specific, and more widely agreed, than that elaborated thus far.7
 
5 See IMF, Press Release No 07/72: IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee Reviews Multilateral Consultation, 
April 14, 2007.
6 Perhaps the multilateral surveillance initiative holds promise: that remains to be seen.  A positive aspect of the 
initiative is, as John Lipsky, the First Deputy Managing Director has said, that it allows the countries most interested 
in and affected by an issue to be at the table rather than having the G8 or some other predetermined group preside.   
However, the recent exercise seemed to suffer both from the near co-incident establishment of regular United States/
China bilateral discussions of economic issues and from the rejection by the Chinese of the decision revising the 1977 
Decision on Fund Surveillance.  Surely the latter episode needs review and reconciliation.
7 The extent to which the world’s perception of the Fund’s role has become clouded is evident in a recent column 
by Jeffrey Gartner in the Financial Times (October 11, 2007). In discussing how to prevent a rout of the declining 
dollar, he advises, inter alia, undertaking “…a thorough examination of the future of the dollar in the international 
economy…”  He would assign that task to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). He never mentions the IMF.6
b. The Financing Role of the IMF
Overriding  these  specific  questions  is  a  broader  debate  about  the  focus  of  the 
Fund’s work and the allocation- and size- of its staff resources. On one side of this 
debate are those who see the Fund’s primary, or sole, responsibility as surveillance 
–  monitoring  and  providing  advice  on  both  individual  country  economic  and 
financial developments as well as on developments across regions and the entire 
global system. Some of those arguing for this narrower mandate premise their views 
on what they see as the limited need for the IMF to play a financing role in the new 
world of huge and fluid private capital markets. Others, however, see a continuing 
need for the Fund to be prepared to provide financing to member countries in the 
event of a crisis affecting either an individual country or, indeed, a region or the 
global system.
It is telling that the emerging market countries – a growing constituency within the 
Fund,  continue to argue for a readiness on the part of the Fund to provide contingent 
or insurance financing, while some of the major industrial countries - countries that 
are unlikely ever to come to the Fund for financing, argue for giving up the Fund’s 
financing role. The major emerging market countries have been in a sweet spot in 
the global economy in recent years. This has been the result of high commodity 
prices, robust growth in much of the world, high global savings rates contributing 
to low financing costs, and the availability of huge amounts of capital from the 
major surplus countries (China and much of Asia, as well as the major oil exporting 
countries).8  These conditions, together with much better policies reflecting, in part, 
the lessons learned from the Mexican, Asian, Argentine, Brazilian, Russian, and 
other crises of the second half of the 1990’s and the early years of this decade, have 
changed the situations of these countries dramatically, not least, putting them in 
much stronger positions to weather any disturbances or crises that may occur.
The reality, of course, is that the factors contributing to this sweet spot are unlikely 
to last and unforeseen events are likely to create a situation in which the IMF will be 
called upon again to provide distress financing to some of its members.9   It is also 
clear that not all members have found that sweet spot.  There are other emerging 
market economies, in Eastern Europe for example, that are in much less robust 
economic  and  financial  conditions  that  could  be  vulnerable  in  a  less  favorable 
international  economy.    Moreover,  there  are  new  emerging  market  economies 
arising that need both helpful dialogue with and policy advice from an institution 
with the experience of the IMF, as well as possible financing from the Fund in the 
event of problems. The world would do well to listen to those potentially most 
in need of IMF financing when deciding the role of the Fund in this important 
area. It would do well, also, to draw lessons from the recent crisis in the sub-prime 
mortgage market in the U.S. that surprised many in its impact in other countries and 
in other markets, such as the inter-bank and the commercial paper markets. This is a 
renewed reminder that crises can come from unexpected corners and spread rapidly 
in unforeseen ways. Only dreamers can believe that the days of financial crises, 
including those that would warrant intervention by the IMF, are over. 
8 Jack Boorman, Global Imbalances and Capital Flows to Emerging Market Countries, Emerging Markets Forum, September, 
2006. 
9 The recent period of very low lending activity by the Fund is by no means unique in the Fund’s history, and, like 
earlier periods, will not last forever. 7
A new facility designed to provide insurance to emerging market countries in a 
global system characterized by these kinds of risks needs to take these realities 
into account. If a consensus can be found on the financing role of the Fund, 
new facilities, such as a revised contingent credit line or insurance mechanism, 
will likely be required for it to properly fulfill that role. Creating such a facility 
will be no easy task.  There remains no firm agreement among the membership 
regarding  the  conditions  under  which  the  Fund  should  be  prepared  to  lend 
large resources (“exceptional access” relative to quotas) to a member country.   
Similarly, the problems that bedeviled, and ultimately sank, the Contingent Credit 
Lines (CCL) remain unresolved. These include, besides access levels, the trade 
off  between  automaticity  in  drawings  and  the  conditionality  to  be  associated 
with such drawings.  They also include the difficult issues surrounding the likely 
market reactions to either the approval or the denial of access to such a facility 
for a member country. The other financial facilities of the Fund are, of course, 
available to emerging market (and other) countries.  However, a true insurance-
like facility may better meet the needs of these countries in the new global system 
of extraordinarily fluid debt and capital markets. 
These are critical questions confronting the membership, and the divisions among 
members about the Fund’s size, about exceptional access in the context of capital 
account crises, and on related issues need to be reconciled. Agreement should be 
sought on these issues before further deliberations on the appropriate volume of 
financial resources for the Fund and the needed increase in quotas to provide those 
resources.
 
c. The Role of the Fund in Low Income Countries
Beyond  crisis  financing  for  emerging  market  economies  (and,  possibly,  though 
much less likely, for some of the more developed economies), there is a major issue 
regarding the role of the Fund in the low income countries. Financing has been an 
important aspect of that role since the 1970’s. There are some who argue that since 
the Fund is not a development institution, it should not be lending to developing 
countries or, more narrowly, that it should not be lending for development purposes. 
The former argument, in particular, seems specious, and one that is unfair to the 
developing  country  members  of  the  Fund,  who  have  a  right  to  expect  financial 
support in appropriate circumstances.  Many of these countries continue to have 
problems building and managing reserves. Many, even those with large aid inflows, 
may temporarily run balance of payments deficits of the kind that the Fund was 
conceived, or has evolved, to help ameliorate. This is not to say that if the G8 countries 
and other donors were to come forward with the volume of aid flows promised at 
Gleneagles at the G8 summit in 2005,10 and if commodity exports of many of even 
the poorest developing countries continue to be as buoyant as they have been in 
recent years, there would not be less need for Fund financing for these countries. 
But that in no way suggests that it would be wise to close down the Fund’s capacity 
to lend, on appropriate terms, to these countries or to shift the capacity for such 
lending that now exists in the Fund to another institution such as the World Bank.11  
10 See the communiqué from the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, 2005.
11 One approach to this issue is contained in The Report by the External Review Committee on IMF – World Bank 
Collaboration (the Malan Report), February 23, 2007, which suggests that the Fund provide only short-term credit to 
these countries leaving all longer-term lending to the World Bank.8
Fortunately, there is generally broad agreement that the macroeconomic stability, 
and associated growth, seen in many of the poorer countries over the last decade 
owes something to the advice provided by the Fund to these countries, most often in 
the context of Fund financing arrangements. This capacity should not prematurely 
be taken away.
But two other issues must be confronted in this debate over the role of the Fund in 
the low income countries. The first is the conditionality sought by the Fund when 
lending to these countries. The second concerns the scope of the Fund’s analysis 
and involvement in the economic, financial, and social issues confronting these 
countries. The conditionality debate has gone on for years, but there is broader 
agreement  now  -  even  among  many  of  the  Fund’s  critics,  that  conditionality, 
especially macroeconomic conditionality, is both legitimate and can be helpful to a 
country – as well as protective of the Fund’s financial resources. The conditions for 
assuring the effectiveness of conditionality – not least ownership of policies by the 
government and affected segments of society, are now better understood. There is 
also broad agreement that the Fund should both limit the structural conditions it 
attaches to its financing and concentrate them in the core areas of its expertise, e.g., 
fiscal and budgetary systems, financial markets, etc. and leave to others, especially the 
World Bank, areas such as civil service reform, privatization and the like.12 Debates 
about how to make limited and focused structural conditionality more effective 
and less intrusive should, and will, continue. While care needs to be taken to assure 
uniformity of treatment across the membership, it is clear that such conditionality 
needs to be well tailored to the circumstances of each member: its track record 
in  policy-making;  its  record  under  financing  arrangements  with  the  Fund;  and 
the extent and depth of ownership of the adjustment and reform measures being 
implemented with Fund support. Beyond these issues, broader agreement needs 
also to be found regarding the appropriateness of using crisis situations to bring 
about changes in the institutional and structural characteristics of the economy that 
may have contributed to the emergence of a crisis – something for which the Fund 
was widely, but wrongly, criticized for during the Asian crisis. 
The second issue regarding the Fund’s work in low income countries concerns the 
breadth of the Fund’s analytic focus and collaboration with other agencies. Much 
greater clarity and better guidance to staff are needed from both the executive board 
and from management on these issues. What information, and in what detail, is 
needed to do macroeconomic analysis properly and comprehensively in developing 
countries? What should be the time horizon of the Fund’s analysis and projections? 
Has the Fund a role to play in mobilizing or coordinating aid and assessing its 
overall impact on the economy? What is the proper role for the Fund in assessing a 
country’s progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals? 
Enormous  efforts  have  been  made,  and  continue  to  be  made,  both  within  and 
outside the Fund to bring closure to these issues. Some argue that the Fund should 
have  a  narrow  and  relatively  short  term  macroeconomic  view  of  the  county’s 
prospects  and  policies.  Others  believe  that  the  Fund  should  help  provide  the 
overall macroeconomic context over a somewhat longer time period within which 
the country’s development plans will be formulated and implemented. This was 
12 See, for example, the Report on Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs, Independent Evaluation Office, 
International Monetary Fund, forthcoming.9
the concept underlying the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) and its call for close cooperation between the IMF, the World Bank, and 
other active partners of the county, including aid agencies, in determining the role 
each is to play in assisting the country. For the Fund, this latter view implies a need 
for full information about the size and likely sectoral allocation of aid flows, an 
analysis of the capacity of the country to absorb and effectively utilize aid, and the 
impact of financial flows, policies and other factors on the prospects for the country 
to achieve the MDGs.13 All this needs to be set out in the context of a medium term 
macroeconomic and financial development framework. 
These contrasting views of the Fund’s role in the low income countries imply quite 
different levels of involvement with the country, different degrees of cooperation and 
active engagement with the country’s other partners, different information systems, 
and different staffing levels, among other things.  Unfortunately, neither the executive 
board nor management have provided sufficiently clear guidance to the staff about 
where on the spectrum between these two models of Fund involvement they should 
define their role. This has led to confusion among staff, as well as confusion among 
the county’s other partners about what to expect from the Fund. There is an urgent 
need for greater clarity on the Fund’s responsibilities in this work. 
The low income countries would be well-served by an IMF that takes a broad view of 
its role in these countries. The IMF is the only organization that can effectively help 
countries put together all the elements of macroeconomic and financial analysis 
that are needed to have a comprehensive view of the development prospects – and 
requirements – of the country. In doing so, of course, it needs to rely on the expertise 
and information available in other organizations, including aid agencies and the 
development banks. The narrow view espoused by some simply does not recognize 
the requirements for formulating a comprehensive view of macroeconomic policy 
in these countries.
These issues regarding the role of the Fund in surveillance, in financing, and in its 
work with the low income countries are critical to the future direction of the Fund. 
While each has been subject to debate over the past several years, there has been 
insufficient progress in bringing closure to these issues and the work and reputation 
of the institution has suffered as a result. If the Fund is to re-gather its strength 
among the membership and be seen as having a well-defined role under which it 
can effectively partner with other institutions and agencies, and advise its members,   
greater clarity on all these issues is essential.
II. The Governance of the Fund 
A clear mandate, strongly endorsed across the membership, is needed for the Fund to 
play its role in the global economic and financial system. To secure that endorsement 
and the support of the entire membership in carrying out its responsibilities, the 
Fund needs to reverse the slide towards indifference that has been taking place among 
large segments of the membership. This trend has been the result of a number of 
factors, but probably none more important than those involving the governance of 
the institution. This, in turn, depends on the voice and vote of members – individual 
13 In the current situation in which a number of African countries are enjoying increased production and exports of oil 
and other commodities, absorptive capacity assessments become even more critical.10
countries,  as  well  as  the  constituencies  represented  in  the  various  regional  and 
issue-associated groups of members; the effectiveness of a country’s representation 
in the institution, beyond the basic matter of voting power; and the congruence 
between the governing bodies of the Fund and the various agenda-setting bodies in 
the global community that are often the focal point of countries’ engagement in the 
multilateral system.
a. The Voice and Vote of Member Countries 
Clearer principles are needed to help guide thinking on global and institutional 
governance  issues.14    One  of  those  principles  on  which  virtually  all  agree  is 
legitimacy. Unless an organization has a legitimate basis, and is seen as legitimate 
by all those involved with it, it will not have the authority and credibility to carry 
out its mission. The search for legitimacy for an institution like the Fund starts by 
asking what governance features make it acceptable for sovereign countries, and their 
populations, to work with the organization and to give up some of their sovereign 
powers in doing so. Without a willingness on the part of all members to cede some 
authority to the institution, it cannot be effective. In the case of the IMF, it is clear 
that the current distribution of quotas and the relative voice of members within the 
Fund, among other things, are causing its shareholders in various regions of the 
world, as well as other stakeholders, to question its legitimacy.15 
Legitimacy, in the first instance, stems from the governance structure of an institution.   
But is also depends on the way in which that structure operates.  Thus, governance of 
the Fund has many dimensions.  The first dimension centers on the issue of power-
sharing. This is mainly a matter of what is termed “voice and vote.”  That issue is 
under active discussion in the context of the current review of members’ quotas in 
the Fund.  Some progress was made on this issue at the Fund’s annual meetings in 
Singapore in 2006 with the ad hoc quota increases granted to China, Korea, Mexico 
and Turkey. Importantly, the resolution of the Board of Governors adopted at that 
time recognized these ad hoc increases as only a first step.  The resolution called 
on the executive board to reach agreement by the time of the 2007 annual meetings 
on a new quota formula “…to guide the assessment of the adequacy of members’ 
quotas in the Fund” and “… to provide a basis for a further rebalancing of quotas to 
be recommended to the Board of Governors…no later than by the annual meetings 
in 2008.”  The executive board was also called upon to propose an amendment of 
the Articles of Agreement to provide for at least a doubling of the basic votes of 
each member and to safeguard the proportion of basic votes in total voting power.   
It was also envisaged that “…the Board of Governors will consider distributing any 
increase in quotas with a view to achieving better alignment of members’ quota 
share with their relative position in the world economy, while assuring that the IMF 
has adequate liquidity to achieve its purposes.”16
It is, unfortunately, unlikely that the action called for by the Board of Governors will 
address the real and substantive issues of voice and vote in the Fund.  First, on basic 
14 See “ IMF Reform: Congruence with Global Governance Reform”, Jack Boorman in Global Governance Reform, edited 
by Colin Bradford and Johannes Linn, the Brookings Institution, January 2007.
15 The anomalies in the voice and vote of members in the Fund are well known and need not be restated here.  
16 IMF Press Release No 06/205: IMF Board of Governors Approves Quota and Related Governance Reforms, September 18, 
2006.11
votes.  In its report to the Board of Governors in August, 2006, the executive board 
said that “An increase in basic votes, which reflect the principle of equality of states, 
is the appropriate mechanism to give the smallest members of the Fund…a greater 
voice in the Fund’s deliberations.”17  This was an excellent starting point.  When the 
Fund was established in 1944, basic votes (under the same principle of “equality of 
states”) were set at 250 votes for each member.  At that time, these votes represented 
11.3 percent of total voting power.  Basic votes have not been changed since then 
and, with the increase in quotas that has occurred over the years, now represent only 
2.1 percent of total voting power. While the resolution of the Board of Governors 
called for “at least a doubling” of basic votes, language that was repeated in the 
IMFC communiqué of October, 2007, it appears that agreement is emerging around 
not more than a doubling. This would leave basic votes at only about four percent 
of current voting power – an insignificant adjustment. 
  In  a  similar  vein,  the  modifications  to  members’  quotas  themselves,  driven  by 
the adoption of new quota formulas, looks to be less than ambitious.  Perhaps 
most noteworthy is the likelihood that inter-country trade between members of the 
European Union, including members of the euro zone, will continue to be counted 
as a measure of the “openness” of these economies. This is likely to leave the EU-25 
with cumulative quotas of around 32 percent of the total – almost enough for the 
EU together with the United States to take majority decisions in the Fund.  There are 
legitimate legal and other issues here, not least the fact that the EU is not a country 
– the entity that defines membership in the Fund.  However, continuing to count 
this inter-country trade within the Union when calculating quotas is becoming 
increasingly akin to counting trade between California and New York and between 
all the other individual states of the United States in determining the quota of the 
US. If this issue cannot be dealt with through the elimination of inter-country trade 
when applying the quota formulas to EU countries, some other means, including a 
voluntary reduction in quotas by EU countries that would achieve the same results, 
should be considered.
Similarly, an overall increase in quotas – the distribution of which was seen as a 
means of “…achieving better alignment of members’ quota share with their relative 
positions within the world economy” - seems unlikely to produce much change. The 
executive board appears to be considering an increase in the total quotas of only 
about 10 percent—a figure endorsed by the IMFC in its October, 2007 communiqué. 
The entire debate on the quota issue is further undermined by the fact that it takes 
place in an environment in which the future financing role to be played by the Fund 
is uncertain and the differences of view among the membership that arose during 
the crises of the 1990’s about “exceptional access” to Fund resources in the context 
of capital account crises remain essentially unresolved.18 These issues should be 
resolved before any increase in quotas is recommended by the executive board to 
the board of governors.
Clearly a different approach and a different process is needed if any review of quotas 
17 Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors, Quota and Voice Reform in the International Monetary Fund, 
August 31, 2006, p.4.
18 It is interesting that some of the same countries most vociferous in their objection to large access to Fund financing in 
the context of the capital account crises of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s are members of the Euro Zone whose central 
bank, the ECB, has famously, and probably appropriately, flooded the money markets in the face of the disturbance 
related to the sub-prime mortgage crisis of recent months.12
is to produce the kind of change needed to increase the perceived legitimacy – and 
usefulness, of the IMF among large segments of the membership.  At minimum, this 
would require:
Commitment at the highest political levels to support genuine reform and  •	
change;
Resolution of the key issues regarding the appropriate financing role for the  •	
Fund in the case of financial market crises; 
Agreement to a significant increase in basic votes; something on the order  •	
of a quadrupling would be needed just to restore the relative power of basic 
votes to their position when the IMF was established; and
Acceptance that inter-country trade within the EU is not to be included in  •	
calculating  quotas  –  or  some  other  agreement  is  found  to  bring  about  a 
similar adjustment to the aggregate EU quota.
 
Beyond quotas, another aspect of the voice and vote issue is receiving insufficient 
attention. This involves the size and compositions of the executive board – something 
that certain segments of the membership are loathe to put on the agenda.   Two 
questions in particular need urgent consideration.  First, is an executive board of 24 
members the optimal size for an institution like the IMF and for a board that has the 
operational responsibilities of the Fund board?  Much of the literature on the subject 
suggests smaller boards can be more effective.  Second, what needs to be done to reduce 
the indefensible position of the European countries in the executive board that now 
occupy eight of the 24 chairs and are represented in one other constituency?  This is 
an historical anachronism that needs to be corrected. The enormous contribution of 
the Europeans to the IMF, including their generosity in supporting the concessional 
windows for Fund lending to low income countries, as well as other initiatives, needs 
to be recognized. Nonetheless, the Europeans need to recognize that they hold the 
key to genuine reform on the voice and vote issues. They should accept a reduction in 
quotas and they should agree to reduce their representation in the executive board to 
no more than three chairs. Among other things, a reduction in the number of European 
chairs would provide room for additional representation by African countries, 43 of 
which are now represented by only two executive directors. Without a willingness on 
the part of the Europeans to give ground on these issues, it is virtually impossible to 
see how genuine reform can be brought about in the Fund. 
Will any of these, or other, changes make a difference to the real and perceived 
legitimacy  and  operations  of  the  Fund?    Europe  may  come  out  of  such  change 
with a stronger and more effective voice.  This would allow it more effectively to 
counter the power of the United States.  A genuine power shift – in accord with the 
economic and financial realities of the global economy – would provide the emerging 
market countries with a greater sense of ownership in the institution.  Substantially 
enlarging basic votes could do the same for the low income countries, as would an 
additional chair for the African countries.  All of this could also affect the power 
blocks and alignments that form to determine the orientation and evolution of the 
Fund as globalization continues to change the relative positions of members in the 
international economic and financial system. 13
Other reforms also deserve consideration. For example, proposals have been made to 
expand the use of double majority voting in the Fund. At present, a double majority 
– 85 percent of voting power and a sixty percent majority of members – is required to 
amend the Articles of Agreement. Double majority voting (quotas and chairs) could 
also be considered for the selection of the managing director and the chair of the 
IMFC, as well as for key policy decisions and, perhaps, even to approve large-access 
lending operations.19 These changes could help strengthen the weakening consensus 
tradition in the Fund by requiring a majority of members to support those decisions that 
determine the direction of the Fund. It could also help mute the undue power of some 
of the major shareholders in the Fund.  These and other changes in the way business 
is conducted in the IMF would help correct the legitimacy deficit in the Fund and help 
regenerate a sense of ownership of the institution among the full membership. 
b. The Governance Structure within the Fund
The second dimension of the governance issues confronting the Fund involves the structure 
of the institution and the workings of the various bodies charged with responsibility for 
overseeing and for managing the institution.  Here, the major issues concern the specific 
responsibilities and, critically, the accountabilities of these different bodies. While this 
dimension of governance of the Fund has received less attention than the voice and vote 
issues, there does seem to be an increasing willingness to take it on. 
The organizational structure of the Fund has some unique implications for the 
governance of the institution.  That structure is clearly defined in the Articles of 
Agreement. Its main elements include the board of governors; the executive board; 
management; and staff. The Interim Committee and its successor, the IMFC, were 
added later. The Articles are also reasonably clear about the powers of the various 
components of the structure:
The  board  of  governors  makes  the  major  decisions  –  on  quotas,  SDR  •	
allocations, gold sales and the like, and bears overall responsibility for the 
operation of the institution;
The IMFC was established as an advisory body, but, in reality, it is a power  •	
unto itself;
The executive board is charged in the Articles with “...conducting the business  •	
of the Fund…” and takes most of the operational decisions;
Management runs the Fund on a day to day basis under what the Articles call  •	
“…the direction…” of the executive board. Even on matters involving the 
organization, appointment, and dismissal of staff, management is subject to 
“…the general control of the executive board…”
The staff operates under the direction of management. •	
19 Mr. Strauss-Kahn, the new managing director, said in his statement to the executive board on September 20, 2007: 
“I have given the example of a double majority voting system (quotas and chairs) as a way to better insure that key 
decisions command the appropriate level of consensus. While I don’t think any institutional change is mandatory, 
I can nevertheless make a commitment to consider that any decision not likely to obtain the support of a qualified 
majority of chairs should be delayed by the MD.”14
Beyond  theses  general  responsibilities,  there  is  some  lack  of  clarity  about  the 
specific roles of these various bodies. Some of that is dealt with in the By-Laws, but 
gaps remain. More importantly, too few well-defined mechanisms and processes 
have been established to assure that all these players, especially the executive board 
and the managing director, carry out their responsibilities in accord with the best 
practices of organizational governance. By way of example: 
The  executive  board,  according  to  the  Articles  of  agreement,  “selects  the  •	
managing director” and can dismiss a managing director. But, to date, and in 
substance, that has not been the case.
Similarly, while the Articles specify that the managing director operates under  •	
the general control of the executive board, in fact, no one really assesses the 
extent to which the board gives effective direction, or how the managing 
director or management more generally, performs under that direction.20  
Some  of  these  governance  problems  stem  from  unresolved  issues  that  originate 
in the unique nature of the Fund and the way in which governance best practices 
should be applied in such an institution. For example, the Board of Governors is 
the closest analogy to a corporate body representing the owners. But it has some 
crucial characteristics that distinguish it from the traditional corporate board. For 
one, while its composition changes – governors come and go, the ownership they 
represent changes only as new members join the Fund through what is essentially 
a political process. There is no market for shares in the Fund. And perhaps most 
importantly, no one from the outside can capture a share of the ownership, appoint 
like-minded people to the board of governors or the executive board, and force 
change and reform on the institution as happens in the corporate world. There 
can be no takeover or buyout by a Warren Buffet or other outside investors or 
stakeholders! This is as it should be in an inter-governmental institution like the 
Fund. But it means that change has to come from within what is essentially a static 
membership and ownership, and it raises questions about how stakeholders other 
than governments can bring about change and reform.
Similarly, the role and nature of the executive board also challenges some of the 
traditional concepts of governance. Boards in the private corporate sector and the 
non-profit sector, and sometimes in the official sector, have rather circumscribed 
decision-making authority. Boards typically select the CEO, decide compensation at 
the most senior levels, determine major strategic issues, and the like. But running 
the organization is left to the managers – subject to general oversight by the board. 
This tradition leaves the decisions of such boards at a rather high level; they are not 
of an ongoing operational nature. A corporate board’s role in operations is typically 
very limited.
The responsibilities of the executive board of the IMF are very different and far 
more extensive. The board has many of the high level and strategic decision-making 
20 As just one operational example, there is too often a lack of clarity in the direction given to management and staff 
on policy matters in the summings-up which conclude board discussions. This is often the result of a failure to find 
consensus in the executive board. But it makes assessing the performance of management in carrying out that direction 
and holding management accountable nearly impossible. This is one of the causes of the lack of clarity regarding the 
Fund’s role in the low income countries where a failure to find consensus in the executive board is reflected in a lack 
of clear direction in the summings-up of executive board discussions. 15
powers of a corporate board. However, aside from the specific organizational and 
personnel decisions that are left mostly to the managing director, the executive board 
takes virtually all of the key decisions within the Fund. On surveillance, the board 
completes the exercise with a decision expressing the Fund’s views about a country’s 
policies;21 on lending, the board approves every program and the financing offered 
by the Fund in support of that program and reviews the country’s performance 
under the arrangement with the Fund almost continuously; it decides what financial 
instruments the Fund has at its disposal,  its surveillance powers, and it recommends 
key decisions on quotas, SDR allocations, gold sales, etc. to the board of governors. 
Even in areas where the executive board does not take specific operational decisions 
– for example, in the allocation of technical assistance, it periodically reviews and 
assesses the decisions taken by management. 
Thus, the Fund executive board is not simply an oversight body as are most corporate 
boards; it is the main player in most of the specific decisions taken in the Fund. 
From a governance perspective, this reality makes the Fund board’s oversight role 
more complex as it is a direct actor in what it is supposed to oversee. At minimum, 
this complicates the assigning of responsibility and accountability in the Fund – two 
key elements in any system of governance. Compounding this problem is the fact 
that there has been no formal process for assessing the performance of the executive 
board.  Some attempts are made at self-assessment, through periodic reviews of 
board procedures, board retreats, and other means.  However, it is clear that these 
are not sufficient.  At minimum, there should be a formal process of self-assessment 
by the executive board – a process seen elsewhere as a developmental tool for 
improving the performance of corporate and other  boards.  Consideration should 
also be given to mandating an independent assessment of the board’s performance, 
with the outcome reported to the IMFC or to the board of governors. 
Another long-standing reality in the Fund is the ill-defined role and responsibility 
of individual executive directors. Executive directors are often described as wearing 
two hats: one as the representative of a member country or group of countries that 
appoint or elect him/her; and one as an official of the Fund. There can be conflicts 
in these two roles. But while theses dual roles have never been well elaborated, they 
can affect any effort to judge responsibility and accountability.22 Given the lack of 
clarity on this issue, it may be preferable to cease referring to executive directors as 
“officials of the Fund” and recognize that, substantively, and appropriately, they act 
as representatives of the countries that appoint or elect them.  Similarly, the calls for 
executive directors to be “independent” including through longer than the current 
two year terms and other changes seem inconsistent with the nature of the IMF as 
an inter-governmental body.  It would be preferable to recognize these realities and 
consider changes that would result in more senior and more experienced individuals 
21 Interestingly, while the executive board concludes the consultation process with individual members in the context 
of surveillance, it is the staff that presents its views on the global situation in the World Economic Outlook and the Global 
Financial Stability Report.
22 What happens, for example when political considerations formulated in capitals trump the judgment of an executive 
director. For example, what if an executive director comes to the conclusion that a policy program put forward by 
a member country – and recommended for approval and financing by management, is inadequate to restore the 
country’s economic and financial viability? A director’s fiduciary responsibility to the Fund would suggest a vote 
against approval of such a program and the financing to support it so as to protect the Fund’s resources.  But he or 
she may be instructed by his or her authorities for political or other reasons to vote in favor of that loan.  How does 
that affect judgments about responsibility and accountability, especially if the executive director’s concerns turn out 
to have been correct?16
serving as executive directors.  A non-permanent board that meets at the Fund’s 
headquarters in Washington, DC only periodically to take major decisions (say 
one week each month) might help bring about some of these, and other, welcome 
changes.23 These issues warrant much more discussion and debate. 
There is another complexity here separate from the one embodied in the issue of 
the two hats worn by an executive director. While judging the responsibility and 
accountability of an executive director representing a single country may confront 
the issue raised above, that judgment is even more difficult in the case of a director 
elected by a multi-country constituency. To whom, exactly, is he/she accountable? 
Other than at the time of the next election, can anyone remove an executive director 
representing a multitude of countries? This, too, has never been clarified.24
c. Governance from Outside the Fund
The third dimension of Fund governance is what, for the want of a better name, can 
be called governance from the outside, i.e., the way in which entities beyond the 
Fund’s own traditional governing bodies influence the Fund and its policies and 
decisions. This includes the roles played by the various agenda-setting bodies in 
the global community, perhaps most importantly the G7/8, as well as the roles to 
be played by civil society organizations, the private financial community, and other 
stakeholders
There are important evolutionary forces that affect the influence that outside bodies 
have on the policies and operations of the Fund. On the official side, there has been 
the emergence, and ever-increasing visibility, of the various global bodies such as the 
G7/8, the G20, the G24 and others. Witness the trend in the last fifteen years or so of 
a system in which the G7 deputies are in almost permanent contact with each other, 
and often with Fund management and staff, on policy and operational issues active 
in the Fund. More recently, there has been the institution of preparatory meetings of 
the deputies to the twenty-four ministerial members before IMFC meetings. Prior to 
that, Interim Committee meetings were prepared by the executive board. It may be 
argued that there are positive and productive aspects of these evolutionary changes 
in terms of better engaging senior officials in capitals on Fund issues, resolving 
differences of view without involving the ministers, and the like. However, one 
can also argue that this practice, along with a number of other developments, has 
eroded  the  authority  of  the  executive  board  and  the  role  of  executive  directors. 
A clear assessment needs to be made about the impact of these changes on the 
governance of the Fund. The practice of having the executive board responsible for 
23 Among other changes that would occur as a result of moving to a non-permanent board would be closer contact 
of executive directors with their capitals and fewer board meetings. The latter would permit the managing director to 
chair a higher percentage of all meetings.  As one of the motivations for creating two additional deputy positions in 
1996 was to have additional people on the management team who could chair the board, this management structure 
could also be re-considered (see below).
24 In thinking about governance issues of the executive board, there is an additional matter that clouds the rules of 
governance within the Fund.  That is the role of the managing director as chair of the executive board.  He, too, has 
several hats that can sometimes sit uneasily with each other – as chair of the board; as CEO; as head of the staff; as the 
public face of the Fund; etc.  Is his position as chair of the executive board fully consistent with best practices of good 
governance?  Do the rather unique responsibilities of the executive board itself validate the arrangement?  Does the 
obvious need for a single individual to have responsibility for running the institution, especially when the executive 
board is a times tempted to take on that role, recommend continuance of the managing director’s chairmanship of the 
board? These issues, too, require further discussion. 17
the preparatory work for IMFC meetings would seem to be warranted. Intervention 
from capitals on critical issues can be managed through the executive directors, 
as should be the case with most of the other business of the Fund. Increasing the 
seniority of executive directors, and possibly making the board a non-permanent 
body with executive directors spending most of their time in their capitals, could 
facilitate resolution of this issue. 
The emergence of the various agenda-setting groups has also affected the work of 
the staff and management of the Fund and raise questions about how staff interact 
with these groups and with the executive board. Staff contact with these groups 
probably began most intensively with the G-10 in the 1970’s. There was a tradition 
that staff returning from meetings of the G-10 in which they had participated would 
brief the executive board on those discussions. This practice seems to have fallen by 
the wayside even as the number, and perhaps the importance, of these groups has 
increased and staff and management contact with representatives of such groups at 
various levels – deputies, deputy deputies, etc., has intensified
The existence of these groups has also called into question the extent to which 
the  principles  of  good  governance  are  adhered  to  in  the  official  international 
community.  In  the  Brookings  paper  referenced  earlier,  one  of  the  principles  of 
global governance discussed was “subsidiarity”.  This principle says that functions 
that  subordinate  organizations  can  perform  effectively  belong  more  properly  to 
them than to a dominant central organization or group. This is in some ways an 
issue of “voice” in that it suggests that specific policies and decisions be left to those 
most affected by them, but within a broad framework established by the dominant 
or global organization. Leaving issues to those likely to have the greatest expertise 
would also generally support the principle of subsidiarity. This principle also helps 
limit the agenda of the more global organization or authority, hopefully providing 
greater efficiency.
The subsidiarity principle is important in the context of the IMF because pulling issues 
unnecessarily out of the executive board of the Fund and up to the various agenda-
setting bodies such as the G7/8 has been, at times, both counterproductive and 
potentially harmful to good governance practices. Recent examples include dealing 
with the various debt relief initiatives, especially the Multilateral Debt Reduction 
Initiative (MDRI), and the formulation of various Fund financing facilities such 
as the Contingent Credit Lines and, earlier, the Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility – neither of which proved operational as formulated.25 If the 
agenda-setting body, the G8 in the case of MDRI and many other initiatives, had 
restricted itself to setting out some general principles and desirable objectives and left 
it to the institutions to figure out how it should be done – that is, if the subsidiarity 
principle had been respected, better policies would likely have been formulated and 
a greater sense of ownership of these policies among the rest of the membership 
would have resulted.
25 The story of the MDRI is a sorry one. The proposals adopted by the Finance ministers of the G8 in June 2005 and 
endorsed by the Leaders at the Gleneagles Summit were formulated not in the executive board of the Fund or the other 
affected institutions, but by the G8 deputies, reportedly amidst serious differences of view about what should be done. 
What came out of their discussions and compromises was, in the view of many, unfair to many low income countries 
and was, in other ways, seriously flawed. In fact, what was proposed for the Fund was inconsistent with the Articles of 
Agreement and an unhappy construct had to be put together by the staff and accepted by the executive board to make 
it workable, even if still not optimal.18
Different issues arise regarding the relationship between the Fund and the private 
sector  financial  community  and  civil  society.26  This  is  an  issue  needing  greater 
attention as the role of such bodies under law, as well as in the context of accepted 
concepts and practices of human rights, keeps evolving.  Perhaps most important 
in the current context is to further increase the transparency of the Fund so that 
individuals and groups in these communities, and others, can participate as informed 
partners of their governments in the issues being discussed and debated within the 
Fund.27 One aspect of this concerns the transparency of the deliberations of the 
executive board. The High Level Panel on IMF Board Accountability convened by 
the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition made a number of specific suggestions 
in  this  area.  Greater  transparency  of  the  executive  board  would  help  increase 
public understanding of Fund decisions and also provide a means to increase the 
accountability of individual executive directors.
In short, governance of the Fund needs to be set in the context of these global 
governance issues and the global governance structures that have emerged over 
recent decades. One cannot pretend that the agenda-setting bodies, and the decisions 
taken in those bodies, do not impact in a fundamental way the manner in which the 
Fund does its work and the extent to which those in the Fund – executive directors, 
management and staff, can be held responsible and accountable for the actions of 
the Fund.  One cannot also pretend that changing the voice and vote of member 
countries within the Fund will, by itself, resolve the issues of representation unless 
the issues surrounding these global agenda-setting bodies are also addressed. These 
are complex issues and they are obviously well beyond the capacity or authority of 
Fund management or the Fund executive board to resolve. Nevertheless, the Fund is 
impacted in fundamental ways by the organization and work of the agenda-setting 
bodies. A major international effort should be launched to review the way in which 
these bodies are organized and how they relate to the governing bodies of the major 
international organizations.28
d. Other Important Governance Issues
In addition to these fundamental challenges to governance of the Fund that stem 
from the specific nature and structure of the institution, from the global institutional 
setting  within  which  it  operates,  and  from  its  management  model  (see  below), 
there have been very specific events and actions that have aggravated the governance 
problems in the Fund. These persistent problems have reduced the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the Fund, and have frustrated those who have been looking for better 
governance and greater accountability in the institution. The specifics include: 
The selection process for the managing director where, by all appearances,  •	
the  Europeans  and  the  United  States  seem  intent  on  holding  onto  the 
26 See, for example, High Level Panel on IMF Board Accountability: Key Findings and Recommendations, New Rules for Global 
Finance Coalition (www.new-rules.org), April 10, 2007.
27 There appears to have been a lapse in practice recently as the staff papers prepared for executive board discussions 
on the revision of the 1977 Decisions on Surveillance and on quota issues have not been available outside the Fund, 
except when leaked.
28 There is, of course, the major issue of the composition of the various groups and their legitimacy in talking among 
themselves and issuing guidance to the international community on a broad range of issues – issues critical to countries 
not included in the groups. The most notorious recent example is, of course, the discussions in the G7/8 about the 
Chinese exchange rate.19
anachronistic  practice  of  determining  by  themselves  who  becomes  the 
managing director of the IMF and who becomes the President of the World 
Bank. The events of recent months seem to suggest unwillingness on the part 
of the Europeans and the US to reform this process – notwithstanding efforts 
by the executive board itself in July, 2007 to open the selection process to 
candidates from the entire membership.29 Now that a European has been 
selected by the executive board, it is time to review again the selection process 
and to evaluate the guidelines established by the board in July, 2007 against 
that experience. Clearly, changes are needed to create a genuinely open and 
competitive process in which it is less likely that a small group of countries 
with significant voting power can preempt the process as was done on this 
occasion. The prospect of having to face a double-majority vote to select the 
managing director might help in this regard.
Similarly, the process through which the chair of the IMFC is selected needs  •	
reform.  During much of the time that the Europeans have monopolized 
the position of managing director, they have also held the chair of the 
IMFC and its predecessor the IC. Even in the current round, a European 
was nominated and ultimately selected as IMFC chair at the same time that 
the Europeans were insisting on retaining their prerogative to name the 
managing director. 
Finally, just as the selection process for managing director demands reform,  •	
the tradition of appointment of the first deputy managing director by the 
United States needs to be ended.  In that position as well, a process open 
to candidates from all member countries needs to be instituted. If a multi-
deputy  management  structure  is  maintained,  care  needs  to  be  taken  to 
assure a reasonable geographic dispersion of nationalities in these positions 
over time. But, at the same time, the selection process needs to operate in a 
way that helps assure that it delivers individuals with whom the managing 
director can work effectively.  The managing director should have a say in 
that selection. 
III. Managing the Fund
In recent years, there have been questions raised about the way in which the IMF 
has  been  managed.  Many  of  the  issues  were  widely  known  and  discussed  both 
within and outside the Fund, including in commentaries in the press. There have 
been important issues regarding the leadership provided by management in seeking 
consensus on key policy issues in the executive board and in clarifying for staff 
the operational implications of decisions on which consensus has not been found. 
Other issues have included the proper balance to be sought between travel by the 
management team and time spent at headquarters and in chairing the executive 
board. There have also been questions regarding the way in which staff was managed 
and supervised, and questions about the conditions that had given rise to evident 
29 The executive boards of the World Bank and IMF established in 2000 working groups to review the selection 
processes for the Bank President and the Managing Director of the IMF. The working groups submitted their reports 
to the executive boards in April 2001. The reports were “endorsed” by executive directors on the two boards and were 
provided to the IMFC which “took note” of them. The boards at that time were asked to consider further steps to 
reform the process. In this light, it is difficult to understand why the IMF board seemed caught by surprise in 2007 and 
had to re-open the issue as if little or nothing had been done before.20
problems affecting morale within the institution.30  These are the kind of issues that 
should be discussed in the context of deciding the priorities for a managing director 
and the deputy managing directors of the Fund – priorities that should be set by 
the executive board. Discussions on the six-monthly work program have not been 
sufficient to deal with these issues. Experience suggests the need for a robust process 
of review by the executive board of the way in which a managing director is carrying 
out the responsibilities of the office.
As in any large organization and, to some extent, independent of the formal structure 
of management, the perceptions of individual managers of their responsibilities 
and priorities, as well as the relations between managers, will affect the way in 
which the organization is managed. This is inevitable. At the same time, it is the 
responsibility of the executive board under the Articles to oversee the management 
of the Fund and to give “…general direction…” to the managing director. Had there 
been regular assessments of management by the executive board, a number of issues 
that have arisen and that have affected both the substance of the Fund’s work and 
the efficiency of its operations may have been uncovered and possibly dealt with as 
they became evident.
But there may well be a structural problem here as well. For many years, the Fund 
was managed by a managing director and a single deputy managing director. This 
model became clearly untenable as the work, responsibilities, and array of activities 
asked of the Fund by the membership expanded significantly in the 1980’s. The 
major change made to address this reality was the creation in 1994 of two additional 
deputy positions – providing for a total of three deputies, with one designated as 
“First Deputy Managing Director” and intended to be clearly senior to the other 
two. All three deputy managing directors have the authority to act as chair of the 
executive board in place of the managing director. This structure seemed to suffice 
for some years. However, it may be argued that it was the confluence of highly 
complimentary skills and personalities among the members of the management 
team in those years that accounted for the success of this model. It remained an 
open  question  as  to  whether  the  new  structure  was  optimal  for  the  institution 
under different circumstances. The experience of the last several years, a period of 
less activity than during the crises years of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, raises 
important questions about the sufficiency of that management structure. 
Under  the  current  structure,  each  DMD  has  oversight  responsibility  for  some 
country work, certain policy issues, and various administrative areas. The country 
work is demanding, partly because of the travel and representation responsibilities 
involved, partly because of the internal processes that demand review and sign-
off of virtually all country documents by a member of the management team, and 
because of the time that must be dedicated to chairing the executive board. The 
policy and administrative responsibilities are similarly daunting. The organization 
of administrative functions – the budget, personnel / human resources, and the like 
– may be particularly problematic as they are spread across the DMDs.31  Beyond 
these issues, it can be argued that this multi-deputy structure, in addition to other 
forces, has also had the effect of diminishing the role and stature of department 
30 These problems were well-documented in the Staff survey conducted in 2003.
31 Problems in this area were also highlighted in staff responses to the survey conducted in 2003.21
directors. This results from management sometimes keeping issues and decisions 
within the team to the exclusion of others that should be involved; holding review 
and sign-off authority on both country and policy papers – the modus operandi 
of the Fund – to itself; and dominating the Fund’s representation in many fora in 
the international system. This plethora of time-consuming and travel-demanding 
responsibilities has also robbed management of the time to be sufficiently visible 
within the institution and to provide clear guidance to staff on the issues confronting 
the work of the Fund.
Various changes have been made to help deal with some of these problems. Offices 
have been established to help organize some of the administrative responsibilities 
of management; the deputy directors have each been provided a special assistant to 
help manage their offices, and, more recently, some sign-off authority has reportedly 
been delegated to department directors.   However, some of these changes have 
themselves had unintended consequences, including a possible further reduction in 
the stature and authority of department directors. 
Unfortunately, evident weaknesses continue to exist and no comprehensive review 
of the management structure has been conducted, nor has serious consideration 
been given to alternative structures. Suggestions that outside experts be brought in 
to review the management structure are usually dismissed on the grounds that the 
Fund is a unique institution and that expertise from outside will not be attuned to 
its special needs. There may be some truth to that. But it is also likely that outside 
management expertise would be a useful resource to tap to solicit an assessment 
of the current system and to begin to develop a set of alternatives that could be 
subjected to debate and discussion internally. That should be a priority for the new 
managing director. If management does not take the lead, the executive board, 
under its oversight responsibilities, should itself commission a review of the Fund’s 
management structure.
Management’s leadership of staff also needs to be an element of the executive board’s 
review of management’s performance. There are some long-standing issues, noted 
earlier in this paper, that should be addressed:
Has the mix of staff been properly adjusted to the realities of the modern,  •	
complex global financial system?
Has the organization of staff been sufficiently re-oriented to most effectively  •	
bring  together  the  extensive  experience  that  exists  within  the  institution 
when analyzing and assessing the policies and developments in individual 
countries and providing advice to members – especially at times of crises?
Are staff sufficiently trained in the practical aspects of economic and financial  •	
policy formulation and implementation?
Has the “silo” nature of the departmental structure cited in so many reviews  •	
of various aspects of the Fund’s operations been dealt with sufficiently in the 
recent reorganizations?
Have the concerns voiced by staff about management – most forcefully in the  •	22
extensive staff survey conducted in 2003 – been taken seriously, followed up, 
and effectively addressed?
Work is reportedly underway on a number of these issues, but by all appearances 
much remains to be done.
IV. The Fund’s Income Model
The mechanism through which the Fund generates income to cover its administrative 
expenses – currently nearly $1 billion annually – is ill-suited to the nature of the Fund 
and the cyclical character of its lending operations. The Fund generates most of its 
revenue essentially by setting a margin between the rate charged to borrowing members 
for the use of the Fund’s financial resources and the cost (or rate of remuneration) 
paid to secure those resources from creditor member countries.32    Operating  on 
a spread makes sense for a financial institution that runs, on an ongoing basis, a 
balance sheet comprised of income-earning assets and cost-incurring liabilities such 
as deposits and debt issues. The IMF is not such an institution. In the best of all times, 
when global or regional crises are absent and few members are availing themselves of 
its financial resources, the balance sheet shrinks and the institution has few income-
earning assets and few liabilities. That’s fine for the balance sheet, but it wreaks havoc 
on the Fund’s income stream. Thus, if the Fund serves the community well through 
its  surveillance,  technical  assistance  and  other  non-lending  operations,  thereby 
contributing to stability and growth in the global system and in individual countries,   
it is also, under the current income model, denying itself the resources to cover the 
cost of those activities. This is a contradiction overdue for correction.
In 2006, a group of eminent persons was asked to consider alternatives to the 
current model. The group submitted its report and made specific recommendations 
in January 2007.33  The recommendations included:
Broadening the Fund’s investment mandate, i.e., allowing a broader range of  •	
investments for its reserves to produce additional income on these accounts;
Investing part of the quota resources subscribed by members under a similarly  •	
broadened (and higher yielding) investment authority;
Selling a limited amount of the Fund’s large gold holdings (currently 3,217    •	
metric tons) and investing the profits from such sales in suitable instruments. 
The group advised that such sales be limited and strictly ring-fenced to exclude 
further sales, and that such sales be conducted in such a way as to limit the 
impact on the gold market;
Possibly  charging  member  countries  for  services  provided  by  the  Fund,  •	
including technical assistance.
32 In, practice, there are many complications in the system, including the impact of members’ reserve positions in the 
Fund, burden-sharing mechanisms associated with the arrears of a few members to the Fund,  earnings on the reserves 
held by the Fund, and others. But, in essence, the Fund operates from the revenue generated by the spread on its 
lending operations with member countries.
33 Report by the Committee to Study Sustainable Long Term Financing of the IMF, (the Crockett Report), 
January 31, 2007.23
The group estimated that the proposals to increase the Fund’s investment capacity would 
generate, in total, about $540 million annually.34 The IMFC, in welcoming the group’s report 
as a basis for discussion in the executive board, emphasized that dealing with the budgetary 
issues confronting the Fund also required action on expenditures.  
This is an extremely important issue.  But care is needed to assure the proper outcome. The 
budgetary constraint the Fund faces should not be allowed to dictate the role and direction of 
the institution.  It may well be that budgetary savings, perhaps substantial, can be found.  But 
these issues should be treated in the correct sequence.  The international community should 
first decide what it wants from the Fund; then the staffing and organizational requirements 
– and budgetary needs - to deliver on those responsibilities should be determined. Only 
then should the means be found, including possibly those suggested by the eminent persons 
group, to secure the resources needed to operate the institution.35
V. CONCLUSION
There is a need for a comprehensive vision of the role to be played by the IMF in the emerging 
global economic and financial system.  The elements of needed reform are so tightly inter-
linked that a piecemeal approach that deals with each element separately will not produce 
a coherent strategy.  For example, the quota discussion needs to be better informed by 
agreement on the potential financing role of the Fund and the resources and instruments 
the Fund will need to fulfill that role. The governance issues confronting the Fund need 
to deal not only with the voting power of members, determined essentially by basic votes 
and quotas, but also with all the other factors that determine the effective representation of 
member countries in the institution. These include the size and composition of the executive 
board, the quality and seniority of executive directors appointed or elected to represent 
member countries, the way in which the various global agenda setting bodies, especially 
the G-8, deal with the broader representation in the Fund, and the way in which decisions 
are taken in the institution (e.g., the issues of special majorities or double majorities). These 
and other issues including the processes for selecting the managing director and deputy 
managing directors, as well as the important governance practices to hold management and 
the board accountable for the way in which the institution performs, will all affect the extent 
to which the Fund is accepted as legitimate by the membership and by other stakeholders.   
Obviously, issues of appropriate staffing levels and the organization of staff will have to be 
informed by decisions taken regarding the role the Fund is expected to play in surveillance, in 
financing, in assisting the low income countries, and in its role as a center of macroeconomic 
and financial policy experience and expertise, including as a provider of technical assistance. 
These considerations, in turn, will determine the staffing and budgetary requirements of the 
institution and will serve as input to any discussion of the Fund’s income model.
This will be a complex task to pull all these elements together into a coherent vision for the 
institution.  It will be even more difficult to secure broad agreement among the membership 
on such a vision. Right now, such broad agreement does not exist and the absence of 
agreement is weakening the institution and hindering its effectiveness.  The world needs an 
effective IMF and that effectiveness will be secured only with a major effort to bring about the 
kind of reforms outlined in this paper.
34 The Fund’s current administrative budget is just over $900 million.
35 Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the process underway.  Reportedly, efforts are being made within the G7 to 
strike a grand bargain whereby management of the Fund would accept a specific (and significant) cut in staff positions 
in return for support on some of its reform proposals. Perhaps this would force resolution of some of the questions 
about the appropriate role for the Fund and the associated staffing needs, but it seems a distinctly second-best way in 
which to deal with these important issues. Selected Publications:
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